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1. The nine items are: 1)
(arrears on) mortgage or
rent payments, utility bills,
hire purchase instalments
or other loan payments; 2)
one week’s annual holiday
away from home; 3) a meal
with meat, chicken, fish (or
vegetarian equivalent)
every second day; 4) unex-
pected financial expenses;
5) a telephone (including
mobile phone); 6) a colour
TV; 7) a washing machine;
8) a car and 9) heating to
keep the home adequately
warm. 
ARTICLE 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
lays down the main objectives of the EU. These
include, inter alia, promoting the well-being of its
peoples, a highly competitive social market
economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress, social cohesion, social justice and
combating social exclusion. In the wake of the
global and euro-area financial and economic
crisis, soaring unemployment in most EU
countries and the weak economic outlook raises
the spectre of poverty and social exclusion in a
number of member states, and threatens grave
polarisation within the EU.
According to Eurobarometer (2012), which is the
sixth and most recent wave of monitoring of public
perceptions on the social impact of the crisis, 80
percent of respondents think that poverty has
increased in their country over the past 12
months, while 67 percent say it has increased in
the EU. The survey also suggests a growing sense
of hopelessness and insecurity in a number of EU
countries.
One reason for increasing social hardship might
be fiscal consolidation: the soaring budget deficits
and public debt levels that followed on from the
global and euro-area financial and economic
crises led EU member states to embark on a series
of fiscal retrenchment strategies to stabilise their
public finances. Fiscal consolidation, which often
consists of a combination of lay-offs in the public
sector, cuts in various headline expenditures and
increases in taxes and other contributions, can
have a direct negative impact on the poorest seg-
ments of society. This can be particularly the case
if the enacted fiscal measures weaken public
social protection systems, or laid-off public ser-
vants fall directly into poverty. Indirectly, fiscal
consolidation also holds back economic activity,
which can negatively influence employment and
thus adversely impact household incomes.
POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE Zsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin
However, there are major complications in estab-
lishing a link between fiscal consolidation and
poverty. These relate to the complexities in iso-
lating the impact of fiscal consolidation from other
factors influencing social conditions, the reasons
why fiscal consolidation was needed in the first
place and the choices made about the speed and
composition of fiscal adjustment.
Against this background, this Policy Contribution
evaluates social indicators that can have a bear-
ing on poverty, looks at the fiscal consolidation
strategies of EU member states and assesses the
possible links between fiscal consolidation and
social developments.
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU
The social situation in the EU is alarming. To sum-
marise developments related to poverty, we took
a closer look at four social indicators: the severe
material deprivation rate, the unemployment rate,
the NEET rate (persons not in education, employ-
ment or training) and children in jobless house-
holds, for the EU as a whole and for some major
country groups. We do not analyse the at-risk-of-
poverty rate, one of the three indicators adopted
by the EPSCO (Employment, Social Policy, Health
and Consumer Affairs) Council in the context of the
Europe 2020 Strategy, because it is a measure of
income inequality and not a measure of poverty
(see Box 1 on page 5). High levels of income
inequality can be identified as having adverse
implications for society, as we argued in Darvas
and Wolff (2014), but should not be confused with
poverty.
The most suitable indicator of poverty is the
severe material deprivation rate, which represents
the proportion of people who cannot afford at least
four of nine basic items, including utility bills,
warm food, adequate heating or a car1. The left
panel of Figure 1 on the next page shows that the
03
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONZsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin  POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE
favourable pre-crisis trend of a decline in material
deprivation in the EU was reversed with the crisis,
with some minor improvements observed in
2013. There is an emerging generational divide:
the gap between young and old has widened.
While the fall in severely materially deprived eld-
erly people is a highly welcome development,
more children were severely materially deprived
even in 2013 than in 2007, which is worrying.
There are also major differences between countries
in material deprivation terms, as indicated for
country groups by the right panel of Figure 1.
Before the crisis, material deprivation was very
high but declining in the member states that joined
in the EU in 2004-07. During the crisis, there were
major increases in the Baltic states after 2008, and
after 2010 in the three euro-area programme coun-
tries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) and in Italy and
Spain. In the other EU15 countries there was only
a minor increase and even a slight decline in cen-
tral and eastern European countries, though from a
higher level. These developments suggest that the
east-west divide has narrowed, while the north-
south divide has widened with the crisis.
The country aggregates also mask some
heterogeneity. Poverty in Europe is the most
severe in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary where
more than one-quarter of the population is
severely materially deprived. The trend has been
declining in Bulgaria and Romania but increasing
in Hungary. On the other hand, in Slovenia and the
Czech Republic, the poverty rate was below 7
percent in 2013, well below the EU average.
Among the other 10 EU15 countries poverty was
highest in the United Kingdom with a rate of 8.3
percent in 2013, and lowest in Sweden and
Luxembourg with rates below 2 percent.
Unemployment and the share of people living in
jobless households can have a direct impact on
poverty. Moreover, the longer unemployment per-
sists, the more work-related skills are lost and the
more difficult reintegration into the active labour
market becomes. Figure 2 on the next page shows
that while the unemployment rate in the United
States started to decline already in late 2009, in
Europe it continued to increase up to early 2013.
The recent decline in the EU unemployment rate
is welcome, but it started too late, declined too
little and there are still about 24 million unem-
ployed in Europe, which is very alarming. There is
again major cross-country heterogeneity, as the
right panel of Figure 2 shows: unemployment in
the euro-area periphery is very high, while it is
moderate in the other older EU member states.
There is therefore clear evidence of a wide south-
north divide within the EU, while more recently the
east-west divide has narrowed.
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note. 10 other EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom; Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia; 9 other central and east European states:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. Country group values are calculated
by the total number of materially deprived people in the country group divided by the total population of the group. 2013 data
for Ireland is not available: for calculating the 2013 average of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, we assumed that the number of
severely materially deprived persons in Ireland remained unchanged at the 2012 level of 451,000, while we used the actual
data for Greece (increase from 2.141 million in 2012 to 2.223 million in 2013) and for Portugal (increase from 910,000 in 2012
to 1.148 million in 2013).
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Figure 1: Severe material deprivation rate (% population), 2005-13
2. We do not report the
youth unemployment rate
(which typically considers
the 15-24-year age cohort),
because it is a very impre-
cise measure of forced
inactivity of young people.
Most 15-year olds are in
compulsory education and
very few are looking for
work, but also among, eg
24-year olds, education or
other training activities
occupy a significant share.
The NEET indicator takes
this into account educa-
tion/training activities.
3. Between 2007-13, the
NEET rate remained stable
in Luxembourg and Sweden
and decreased in Austria,
Germany and Malta.
4. For example, by studying
more than 140 million US
birth records for the period
1975-2010, Currie and
Schwandt (2014) found
that a one percentage point
increase in the average
unemployment rate experi-
enced between the ages of
20 and 24 reduces the
short-run fertility of women
in this age range by six con-
ceptions per 1,000 women
and to an to an overall loss
of 14.2 conceptions by the
time these women reach
the age of 40.
A long period of unemployment after graduation,
when a worker should acquire the first skills in the
workplace, can undermine whole careers – creat-
ing a lost generation and also having trickle-down
effects on fertility rates and child support. Empir-
ical research has confirmed a negative causal
impact of unemployment on fertility (Currie and
Schwandt, 2014; Kreyenfeld and Andersson,
2014)4, possibly due to increased income uncer-
tainty related to unemployment.
When children grow up in families in which parents
do not work for long periods or work irregularly,
their current living conditions are curtailed, but
also their opportunities compared to children
whose parents work are affected. This is because
a jobless household might be unable to make an
adequate investment in quality education and
training and therefore a child’s opportunities to
participate in the labour market in the future are
likely to be adversely affected. The empirical
research presented in OECD (2012) found that
higher levels of economic, social and cultural
status of parents are associated with higher edu-
cational attainments for their children.
Figure 4 shows a continuous increase in the share
of children under 18 living in jobless households
between 2008 and 2013, with especially stark
increases in euro-area periphery countries, where
the rates more than doubled. After a dramatic
increase between 2006 and 2010, the Baltic
countries again show a positive development
more recently, though even the most recent 2013
value remains well above pre-crisis levels.
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Unemployment among young people, which is
very high in a number of EU countries, is espe-
cially alarming. Figure 3 shows that young NEETs2
have become substantially more numerous in the
euro-area periphery, but also in central and east-
ern European countries. The only good news is
that after a major increase in the Baltics up to
2010, there is a clear declining trend in these
countries. Among the 28 EU member states, the
proportion of NEETs increased from 2007 to 2013
in 23 countries3, underlining that this is a general
EU problem and not just a problem for the euro-
area periphery.
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: country groups as described in Figure 1 (10 other central and east European coun-
tries also includes Croatia). January 2015 data is not available for Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Greece or the United Kingdom: we
approximated the missing data for these five countries by assuming that the number of unemployed remained unchanged
from December 2014. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate (percent, seasonally adjusted), January 2000 – January 2015
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
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5. http://go.worldbank.org/
0C60K5UK40.
6. http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Gloss
ary:At-risk-of-poverty_rate.
BOX 1: WHAT IS POVERTY AND WHAT DOES THE AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY INDICATOR MEASURE?
The World Bank defines poverty as whether households or individuals have sufficient resources or abili-
ties to meet their daily needs5 and highlights non-monetary aspects, such as health, education and sub-
jective perceptions. 
However, the most widely used EU indicator including the word ‘poverty’, the at-risk-of-poverty rate, is not
a measure of poorness. It measures the share of people with net income after social transfers below 60
percent of national median equivalised disposable income. As Eurostat’s glossary also notes, “this indi-
cator does not measure wealth or poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that coun-
try, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living”6. As Figure 5 highlights, there is a very
strong association between the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the Gini-coefficient of income inequality: the
correlation coefficient is 0.90. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is therefore a measure of income inequality.  
Furthermore, the differences between the national thresholds (which are used to calculate the at-risk-of-
poverty-rate) are so huge that they further underline the inappropriateness of this indicator for assess-
ing poverty trends in Europe. After correcting for the differences in price levels, in Romania, a disposable
income of €2,106 a year (after taxes and social transfers) is considered to be the threshold, while in Lux-
embourg the price-level adjusted threshold is €15,996. This means that if a person’s net income after
social transfers is at the threshold in Luxembourg, she or he can consume 7.5 times more goods and serv-
ices in Luxembourg than a Romanian person at the national threshold in Romania. This is an enormous dif-
ference. But even the difference between two less extreme countries, Austria and the Czech Republic, is
substantial: after taking prices into account, someone at the national threshold in Austria can consume
twice as much in goods and services as someone at the national threshold in the Czech Republic. The
anchored version of this indicator, which uses the real value of the 2008 thresholds in later years, does
not address these drawbacks and the inappropriateness of the indicator to measure poverty trends.
Source: Bruegel calculation using data from Eurostat. Note: both
indicators are averaged over 2007-13. The correlation coefficients
between the two indicators in each year between 2007 and 2013
are: 0.92, 0.90, 0.88, 0.90, 0.85, 0.84 and 0.87. The correlation
coefficient between the 2007-13 time averages of the two indicators
is 0.90. The at-risk-of-poverty indicator is ‘At risk of poverty rate (cut-
off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers)’,
while the Gini coefficient is the ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised
disposable income’.
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Figure 5: The correlation between the Gini-coeﬃcient of income inequality and the at-risk-of-poverty indicator
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Source: Eurostat. Note: Jobless households are households
where no member is in employment. Country groups as
described in Figure 1; 10 other central & east European coun-
tries also includes Croatia. Data for Sweden is missing before
2009: for this period the indicator is assumed to evolve in line
with the 9 other EU15 countries.
7. Using the examples of
fiscal adjustment in Den-
mark and Ireland in the
1980s, in their seminal
paper Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990) introduced the
notion of ‘expansionary
fiscal consolidations’,
whereby fiscal consolida-
tion could increase output.
Guajardo et al (2011) chal-
lenged this notion and
found, using a better indica-
tor of fiscal adjustment and
an empirical strategy
applied to a larger set of
countries that fiscal consol-
idation has contractionary
effects on private domestic
demand and GDP.
8. We call fiscal consolida-
tion premature when it is
conducted in an economy
in which the cyclical condi-
tions deteriorate, provided
that markets do not give a
clear signal that public debt
has increased to such a
high level which threatens
public debt sustainability. 
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Overall, social developments in the EU are alarm-
ing and suggest polarisation between the young
and old, between the European south and north,
while the trend in terms of the east-west divide is
more mixed, with some gaps narrowing while
others have widened
THE SPEED AND COMPOSITION OF FISCAL
CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU
There are certain budget consolidation measures
that can have a direct impact on the poorest seg-
ments of society. Social spending cuts can reduce
the benefits people receive and limit the ability of
social protection systems to support the poor.
Public sector lay-offs lead to unemployment if
there are no job opportunities in the private sector.
Cuts in public sector wages reduce the disposable
income of public servants, which can deepen
poverty, if some public servants already belonged
to the poorest segment of society. An increase in
consumption taxes, such as value added tax, has
more adverse impacts on poorer people, because
they spend a larger fraction of their income on
consumption than the people at the upper end of
the income distribution scale.
Beyond these direct impacts, fiscal consolidation
measures can also have an indirect impact on
poverty. Various spending cuts and revenue
increases depress the economy at least in the
short and medium terms7. Recent research con-
cluded that fiscal consolidation has a more signif-
icant negative impact on the economy during a
recession than during expansions, ie the so-called
fiscal multiplier is higher; see for example litera-
ture surveys and own estimates in Baum et al
(2012), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and
Dell’Erba et al (2014). It is also established, as we
will demonstrate, that economic contractions are
strongly associated with a fall in employment in
almost all EU countries, and therefore fiscal con-
solidation can adversely impact social conditions,
including poverty.
Consequently, beyond fiscal measures that can
potentially directly impact poverty, the overall
fiscal consolidation strategies of EU member
states should also be assessed. Policy choices,
such as the actual speed and composition of fiscal
adjustment, can have major impact.
Speed of fiscal adjustment
The EU’s fiscal strategy was based on the convic-
tion that fiscal consolidation was needed to
restore the trust of financial markets, to limit the
increase in public debt levels, and thereby to lay
the foundations for sustainable growth. Undoubt-
edly, low public debt levels come with great ben-
efits. However, premature8 fiscal consolidation at
the EU level likely had significant side effects,
such as the worsening of the cyclical situation of
the EU economy (Figure 6), and the need for fiscal
consolidation at the country level varies.
Fiscal consolidation needs – from an economic
perspective – were different in different EU coun-
tries. Fiscal consolidation was clearly necessary
(at least to some extent) in those member states
in which budget deficits had increased to very
high levels at a time when there was a supposedly
permanent fall in output resulting from the burst-
Source: Bruegel using AMECO and European Commission
(2013). Note: the blue line shows the cumulative change in
structural primary balance (SPB), as revealed by AMECO. The
red line shows the cumulative discretionary fiscal effort (DFE)
as implied by European Commission (2013). We calculated
the EU27 SPB as the weighted average of the euro area 17
and the 10 other EU countries, for which we derived the
weights from the average GDP during 2000-13. We calculated
the DFE for the EU27 the same way, after calculating the euro
area 17 DFE for 2012-13 by weighting the values of the first
17 members of the euro area, because DFE for the euro area
as whole was available in European Commission only for
2007-11. A source of non-comparability between the two
lines is that we use the February 2014 version of AMECO,
while European Commission (2013) calculated DFE using an
earlier vintage of the structural balance.
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ing of unsustainable pre-crisis bubbles. Greece,
for example, had a 16 percent of GDP budget
deficit in 2009, when public debt was 130 percent
of GDP. Under such circumstances, there was no
alternative to fiscal consolidation: the question
was the speed and composition. The speed was
probably too fast and Greece entered a vicious
circle with falling output, lower tax revenue and
larger budget deficits, accompanied by the con-
sequent increased consolidation needs, which
exaggerated the output fall. Entering such a
vicious circle was a major flaw of the Greek assis-
tance programme (Sapir et al, 2014), though the
public finance trajectory had to be rectified.
However, from an economic perspective, at the
aggregate EU level as well as in most EU countries,
budget deficits and public debts did not warrant a
harsh consolidation strategy at a time when the
cyclical position of the EU economy had deterio-
rated considerably. In countries with stronger
fiscal fundamentals more expansive fiscal poli-
cies better aligned to their negative output gaps,
and the needs of the EU aggregate would have not
led to concerns about debt sustainability. Ger-
many has even outperformed both the national
and European fiscal targets (Barbiero and Darvas,
2014). As a comparison, the US and Japan con-
tinue to borrow at low interest rates despite their
much higher public debts and deficits. Therefore,
the issue is not a return to ‘failed old debt-making
policies’ in highly indebted countries, but to
ensure fiscal stabilisation at the EU level as long
as private demand is weak.
Buti and Carnot (2013) challenge some criticisms
of the EU’s fiscal strategy and essentially con-
clude that fiscal consolidation was necessary in
southern Europe, a conclusion that we agree with.
But they are silent on developments in the aggre-
gate fiscal stance of the euro area, which was
strongly influenced by the major fiscal consolida-
tion in Germany and other euro-area member
states with strong fiscal fundamentals. They only
note that the fiscal stance of Germany is now
broadly neutral: this assessment does not con-
sider the implications of the earlier German fiscal
tightening for the aggregate euro-area fiscal
stance at a time when the cyclical position of the
euro area was very weak.
In an elegant model, Merler and Piani-Ferry (2012)
demonstrated that in a monetary union which con-
sists of a competitive, moderately leveraged North
and an uncompetitive, over-indebted South, the
South needs to tighten fiscal policy more than the
North. Consequently, when fiscal consolidation is
too fast in the North, it has to be even faster in the
South, which depresses output and inflation more
in the South, making it more difficult to progress
with debt deleveraging.
The premature aggregate EU and euro-area fiscal
consolidation is hindering the deleveraging of the
private sector and making it more difficult for
southern euro-area member states to implement
their necessary fiscal consolidations. It is pushing
inflation close to zero, making it more difficult to
achieve a symmetric correction in intra-euro area
current-account imbalances. It is also pushing the
euro area and the EU into a strong current account
surplus. This last effect worsens global
imbalances9.
Composition of fiscal adjustment
Beyond the speed, the composition of fiscal
consolidation is also crucial for influencing social
conditions. 
Large-scale support to the financial sector drained
the resources of many EU governments and trig-
gered or reinforced fiscal consolidation efforts,
which in turn depressed the economy with
adverse consequences for the poor. Data from the
European Commission's State Aid Scoreboard,
which is reported in Table 5 of Darvas et al (2014),
shows that in the EU as a whole, recapitalisation
measures and asset-relief interventions
amounted to almost €600 billion in the EU from
2008-12, which is equivalent to 4.6 percent of EU
GDP, a very large amount. In addition, govern-
ments provided various guarantees and liquidity
support measures, which amounted to €906 bil-
lion (7.7 percent of GDP) in 2009, of which €535
billion (4.1 percent of GDP) was still outstanding
in 2012.
Financial-sector support was very high in Ireland,
Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Spain. However, in
eight EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia),
9. Darvas (2010) warned
that premature fiscal con-
solidation at the euro-area
level would likely lead to
these side effects.
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area programme countries. While the aggregate
social payment amounts are in themselves not
informative on the effectiveness of social protec-
tion, and inflation has eroded the real value of
social expenditures (see the last line in Table 1),
this development suggests that governments
might have tried to cushion the negative impact of
the crisis on society, which applies also to those
countries that implemented the sharpest fiscal
adjustments. Indeed, Figure 7 on the next page
clearly indicates that there is no systematic rela-
tionship between fiscal adjustments and social
expenditures; that is, countries that implemented
larger fiscal adjustments did not cut social expen-
ditures more. This is a benign development. The
only exception is Greece. 
However, within social expenditures, pensioners
were the main beneficiaries of fiscal adjustments,
as old-age related expenditure increased more
than other social protection expenditure in every
country group (Table 2 on the next page). Sick-
ness and disability expenditure suffered cuts in
the hardest-hit countries (vulnerable euro-area
members and the Baltic states), but increased in
other EU15 and central and eastern European
countries. Family and child support declined sub-
stantially, by 19 percent in the three euro-area
programme countries, 14 percent in the Baltic
states and 10 percent in Italy and Spain, while
there was only a marginal increase in other EU15
and central and eastern European countries. Infla-
tion eroded further the real value of family and
10. In the central and east-
ern EU members, foreign
banks dominate domestic
banking systems and for-
eign parent banks provided
the necessary capital to
their subsidiaries and
branches established in
other countries. This was
certainly helpful for public
finances in host countries,
yet foreign-owned banks
reduced their activities in
host countries, which can
have adverse effects (see
Figures 1 and 2 of Darvas
and Wolff, 2013).
11. Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank
(2009), Germany: Hypo
Real Estate (2009), Den-
mark: Amagerbanken
(2010, 2008), Spain:
Bankia/BFA (2012,
2010/11), France/Belgium:
Dexia (2012, 2008),
Netherlands: SNS Reaal
(2013), Cyprus: Laiki Bank
(2013, 2012), Greece:
Alpha Bank (2013).
12. The substan-
tial public support to banks
was the main reason for the
shift in bank rescue policies
to more bail-ins, leading to
the Bank Recovery and Res-
olution Directive (BRRD)
and the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM).
no support was provided, while support was tiny in
Finland and small in Hungary, Sweden and Italy10.
At the height of the crisis, public support was moti-
vated by financial stability concerns. However, by
analysing eight bank restructurings between
2008 and 2013 in different countries11, Dübel
(2013) concluded that in all cases significant
potential for creditor participation was wasted, to
the detriment of taxpayers, even if there has been
more emphasis in more recent restructurings on
the depth of creditor participation. These eight
cases underline that even given the financial sta-
bility motive of financial-sector support, bank
restructuring could and should have been imple-
mented in a less costly way for taxpayers, which
would have provided more fiscal space for gov-
ernments for other purposes12.
By considering the main public expenditure cate-
gories beyond bank support, Table 1 shows that
for the EU as a whole and all country groups, public
investment was the major victim of fiscal adjust-
ments. Barbiero and Darvas (2014) argue that
since the fiscal multiplier of public investment is
the largest among the main expenditure and rev-
enue categories of the government, the significant
cut-backs in public investment exaggerated the
output fall.
On the other hand, social payments increased
more than other primary expenditures, or fell less
than other primary expenditures in the three euro-
Source: Bruegel using AMECO data. Notes: Country groups as described in Figure 1. For the Baltics the 2008-13 period is shown,
because fiscal consolidation started earlier in these countries. The aggregates involving countries with different currencies
were calculated using constant exchange rates (the average of 2009-13) and therefore exchange rate fluctuations do not
affect the values shown.
Table 1: Main public expenditure categories net of bank recapitalisation by the public sector, %
change from 2009-13 (in current prices and constant exchange rates)
Share Percent change in current prices, 2009-13
EU28 EU28
Greece,
Ireland,
Portugal
Italy,
Spain
10 other
EU15
Baltics 3
10 other
CEE
Total expenditure 100 6 -15 -2 9 1 9
Interest expenditure 5 20 10 31 15 167 25
Primary expenditure 95 5 -17 -4 9 -1 8
Social expenditures 43 10 -8 8 12 14 13
Compensation of employees 22 2 -21 -6 7 -8 3
Other current primary expenditure 22 3 -24 -9 7 -6 12
Capital expenditure 8 -13 -31 -41 -1 -13 -8
Memorandum: inflation 10 6 9 9 13 12
09
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONZsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin  POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE
child benefits. Unemployment benefits were
increased significantly where it was needed the
most, in the euro-area periphery and the Baltic
states, while they declined in the rest of the EU.
Therefore, intentionally or not, there was redistri-
bution from families and children towards pen-
sioners, while unemployment benefit expenditure
might have helped to mitigate the adverse impact
of unemployment in those countries in which the
unemployment rate has increased the most.
Spending on education was also significantly
reduced in the most vulnerable countries, which
can also affect adversely the young generation.
Fiscal consolidation might also have an impact on
poverty rates by reducing expenditure on public
sector employees. Figure 8 on the next page
shows that countries that implemented larger
fiscal adjustments reduced more their spending
on public sector workers.
Reducing public sector labour compensation can
take two main forms: reducing wages and laying
Share Percent change in current prices, 2009-12
EU28 EU28
Greece,
Ireland,
Portugal
Italy,
Spain
10 other
EU15
Baltics 3
10 other
CEE
Total general govt. expenditure 100 4 -12 1 6 -3 7
Interest payments 5 23 14 32 19 164 22
Broad services 17 -2 -12 -11 2 -15 -1
Economic affairs 9 -5 -45 5 -6 -20 -4
Environment protection 2 -5 -26 -8 -4 -6 21
Health, recreation 17 4 -20 -7 8 -6 12
Education 11 2 -14 -10 5 -7 8
Old age 20 10 0 8 10 15 13
Family and children 4 0 -19 -10 3 -14 1
Housing 1 12 -30 6 13 23 20
Unemployment 4 0 11 14 -5 13 -11
Sickness and disability 6 7 -7 -1 9 -5 12
Other social protection 5 7 -11 5 9 26 8
Memorandum: inflation 8 6 8 7 12 10
Table 2: General government expenditure by function, % change 2009-12 (in current prices and
constant exchange rates)
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat’s ‘General government expenditure by function’ (COFOG) database. Note: Belgium, Croatia, Slo-
vakia and Romania are not included because of lack of data; we report data for the aggregate of the remaining 24 countries of
the EU (EU24). Country groups as described in Figure 1. For the Baltic states the 2008-12 period is shown, because fiscal con-
solidation started earlier in these countries. The aggregates for countries with different currencies were calculated using con-
stant exchange rates (the average of 2009-13) and therefore exchange rate fluctuations do not affect the values shown.
Broad services include: general public services except interest payments, defence, public order and safety and community
amenities.
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat and European Com-
mission (2013). Note: for each country, we checked the start
date of fiscal consolidation and calculated the change in the
indicators from that date till 2013. Social expenditures in the
sum of ‘Social benefits other than social transfers in kind: gen-
eral government’ and ‘Social transfers in kind supplied to
households via market producers: general government’.
Fiscal consolidation is measured by the discretionary fiscal
effort (DFE) indicator of European Commission (2013). Miss-
ing DFE values for Greece (2007-10), Hungary (2007-09) and
Luxembourg (2007-11) completed with the change in struc-
tural primary balance.
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off public sector workers. EU countries adopted
different mixes of these methods: in Ireland,
Romania and Spain, most of the reduction in total
labour compensation resulted from cutting hourly
wages, while in Latvia about half of the reduction
was the result of wage cuts and lay-offs. Wages
were cut the most in Greece (by 20 percent), but
also employment was reduced by 10 percent,
while those who remained employed work more
hours per week now than in 2008 (see Figure 4 in
Darvas et al, 2014).
The cut in the public sector bill might have not
impacted the poorest segments of the society,
because wages in the public sector tend be much
higher than wages in the private sector in those
countries that implemented the largest fiscal
adjustments (see Figure 5 in Darvas et al, 2014).
Also, in some countries public sector wage cuts
were highly progressive. For example in Greece,
where wages were cut by 20 percent on average,
public servants with monthly salaries of less than
€1000 faced only a 2 percent cut, while higher
earners faced larger cuts with the highest earner
category (over €4000) facing a 35 percent cut. Yet
if lay-offs lead to long-term unemployment, then it
certainly has an impact on poverty too.
The analysis of the revenue side of budgets sug-
gests that in the EU as a whole, effective labour
13. Unfortunately, there is
no comprehensive dataset
of tax rates and the compli-
cated tax laws, including
the definition of tax bases
and exemptions, making it
rather difficult, if not impos-
sible, to compare tax rates
and the changes to them.
We therefore compare
implicit tax rates (ITRs),
which measure the effec-
tive average tax burden on
different types of economic
income or activities (labour,
consumption and capital),
as the ratio between rev-
enue from the tax type
under consideration and its
(maximum possible) base.
For example, the ITR on con-
sumption is the ratio
between the revenue from
all consumption taxes and
the final consumption
expenditure of households.
‘While social expenditures were generally preserved relative to other spending categories, there
was redistribution from families, children and education towards pensioners, which may have
contributed to the widening poverty gap between the young and the old.’
taxes fell slightly, effective consumption taxes
increased slightly, while effective capital taxes
were reduced significantly (Table 6 of Darvas et al,
2014)13. But there are diverse developments
within the EU. Labour taxes tended to decrease in
those countries in which they were the highest
before the crisis, while labour taxes increased in
countries with low tax rates. The correlation coef-
ficient between 2008 tax rates and their change
from 2008 to 2011 is -0.57. A similar relationship
can be observed with consumption taxes, though
the correlation coefficient between 2008 con-
sumption tax rates and their subsequent changes
is smaller, -0.31. However, for capital taxes, the
correlation coefficient is close to zero (-0.03), sug-
gesting that the level of the pre-crisis tax rates did
not influence the direction of changes in the tax
rate during the crisis.
Labour taxes are generally structured in a way that
is progressive to some degree, though there are
about ten central and eastern EU members that
have adopted flat personal income tax rates.
Among the most severely hit countries, labour
taxes increased in Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and
Spain, which might have negatively impacted
social conditions, though the effective tax rates in
these countries remained well below the EU aver-
age even after the increase. In Greece, effective
labour taxes declined by 2 percentage points,
which was the third largest decline in the EU.
In the various editions of the Annual Growth
Survey, the European Commission suggested
moving the tax burden away from labour toward
consumption, on the basis that this should boost
labour productivity and promote employment. In
the 2008-11 period, 14 out of the 27 EU countries
followed this advice (of which eight cut labour
taxes and increased consumption taxes, while the
other six countries cut labour taxes more than
consumption taxes). Additionally, two other coun-
tries cut both taxes, but cut labour taxes more
than consumption taxes. Therefore, the direction
of tax changes was in line with the Commission
suggestion in many EU countries. Yet the eco-Source and notes: see Figure 7.
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
UK
GR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
R² = 0.70-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Ch
an
ge
 to
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r w
ag
e 
bi
ll 
(%
)
Fiscal consolidation (% of GDP)
Figure 8: Fiscal adjustment vs public sector
labour compensation during ﬁscal consolidations
11
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONZsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin  POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE
nomics literature has shown how indirect (and in
particular consumption) taxes tend to be regres-
sive, so an increase in consumption taxes bur-
dens more the poorest segments of society.
Finally, during 2008-11, the effective tax rate on
capital was reduced in 17 countries and increased
in only three countries (France, Sweden and Ger-
many). It needs to be seen to what extent these
cuts in effective capital taxes are part of a broader
taxing strategy to attract (or at least maintain)
investment and capital inflows, or if they are a
specific and temporary reaction by the govern-
ments to the crisis, during which corporate profits
plummeted. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISCAL
CONSOLIDATION AND DETERIORATING SOCIAL
CONDITIONS
Academic research on poverty, inequality and
fiscal adjustments
Poverty has various micro and macro determi-
nants, as detailed by, among others, Jäntti and
Bradbury (2003), Valletta (2004) and Zaidi
(2009). Factors such as educational attainment,
age, employment status, family structure, gen-
erosity of social benefits (and especially of family
benefits) and pension generosity are proved to
have a significant negative effect on the odds of
poverty. Macro factors, such as the regional unem-
ployment rate and regional GDP, have also been
found to affect the individual at-risk-of-poverty
status. The key question is thus the interaction
between fiscal austerity and these micro and
macro determinants of poverty.
The literature has also concluded that fiscal
consolidation typically increases income
inequality. If an increase in income inequality
increases poverty too, then one may easily
associate the increase in poverty indicators with
fiscal consolidation.
For example, Ball et al (2013) analysed the distri-
butional impacts of 173 fiscal consolidation
episodes in 17 OECD countries from 1978-2009.
They found that fiscal consolidation typically had
significant distributional effects by increasing
inequality, decreasing wage income shares and
increasing long-term unemployment. On the com-
position of fiscal adjustment, they found that
spending-based adjustments had, on average,
greater distributional effects than tax-based
adjustments.
Woo et al (2013) largely corroborate these find-
ings and also present further results demonstrat-
ing why the composition of austerity measures
matters. They find that progressive taxation and
targeted social benefits and subsidies introduced
in the context of a broader decline in spending can
help offset some of the adverse distributional
impact of consolidation. In addition, they conclude
that fiscal policy can favourably influence long-
term trends in both inequality and growth by pro-
moting education and training among low- and
middle-income workers.
On the other hand, various structural reform meas-
ures adopted in parallel to fiscal austerity meas-
ures could alleviate the negative impact of fiscal
consolidation on poverty. OECD (2011) finds that
regulatory and institutional changes exerted a sig-
nificant impact on the employment rate, and
thereby on poverty. Yet, most policy and institu-
tional reforms also contributed to widening wage
disparities, as more low-paid people entered
employment and the highly skilled reaped greater
benefits from a more dynamic economy resulting
from the reforms.
By analysing data up to 2010, OECD (2013) finds
that taxes and benefits effectively compensated
for part of the overall increases in market income
inequality and poverty. But their impact varied for
different population groups. On average, relative
income poverty increased among children, youth
and adults, but it fell among the elderly.
Therefore, fiscal austerity and poverty trends have
to be put into the broader context of the determi-
nants of poverty and the other measures, such as
structural reforms, as the mere coincidence
between various fiscal indicators and an increase
in poverty does not necessarily imply causality.
But even if there is causality (and we argue below
that there is), conclusions for policy should be
drawn very carefully.
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Co-movements between relevant indicators
Establishing causal links between austerity meas-
ures and poverty is extremely complicated, as we
have discussed, and is beyond the scope of this
paper. We do, however, assess the co-movements
of various indicators, which might shed light on
the impact of fiscal consolidation and adverse
social conditions.
Figure 9 assesses the coincidence between the
fiscal adjustment and the change in the severe
material deprivation rates in two sub-periods:
Panel A shows the expansionary fiscal policy
period while Panel B shows the fiscal consolida-
tion period. For each country we checked the start
of the fiscal consolidation period and therefore set
the exact timing of the variables shown on the two
panels. During the first phase of the crisis, when
most countries implemented fiscal stimuli (ie the
discretionary fiscal effort was negative), there was
practically no relationship (Panel A). However, the
relationship is more pronounced in the period of
fiscal consolidation (Panel B), suggesting that
more fiscal consolidation is associated with
greater increases in poverty.
The relationship between fiscal consolidation and
unemployment is similarly ambiguous in the
period of fiscal expansion (Figure 10, panel A). In
the period of fiscal consolidation, however, there is
a strong relationship: more consolidation is
strongly associated with greater increases in
unemployment, indicated by Panel B of Figure 10.
Furthermore, there is also a strong negative rela-
tionship between fiscal consolidation and GDP
growth, as shown by Panel B of Figure 11; this rela-
tionship is corroborated by a more comprehensive
empirical study by Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
Source: Bruegel using data from European Commission (2013) and Eurostat. Note: missing DFE values for Greece (2007-10),
Hungary (2007-09) and Luxembourg (2007-11) completed with the change in structural primary balance. Last year with an
expansionary DFE: 2008: Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania; 2009: Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Great Britain; 2010: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia;
2011: Finland.
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Figure 9: Discretionary ﬁscal eﬀort and severe material deprivation
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat and European Commission (2013). Note: see notes on DFE under Figure 9.
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Figure 10: Discretionary ﬁscal eﬀort and the unemployment rate
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Unsurprisingly, GDP and unemployment develop-
ments moved strongly together, as labour condi-
tions are well known to be intrinsically related to
the business cycle. This relationship holds both
before and after 2009, as indicated by Figure 12. 
Consequently, to the extent that fiscal consolida-
tion measures weakened GDP growth and
increased unemployment, and if unemployment
is a main determinant of poverty, one can con-
clude that fiscal consolidation has led to an
increase in poverty. Gallie, Paugam and Jacobs
(2003) and Matsaganis (2013) also established a
link between long-term unemployment and
poverty. Using a panel regression, Duiella and Tur-
rini (2014) found that long-term unemployment
appears the most significant and robust explana-
tory factor for relative and absolute poverty,
stronger than income-per-capita variables. They
also found that social protection expenditure has
a significant impact.
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat and European Commission (2013). Note: see notes on DFE under Figure 9.
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Figure 11: Discretionary Fiscal Eﬀort and GDP growth
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat and AMECO database (February 2014).
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Figure 12: GDP growth and unemployment rate
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Europe faces major social challenges: the share of
severely materially deprived people, unemploy-
ment and the share of children living in jobless
households is high, and European citizens per-
ceive that poverty has increased. Within Europe,
the degree of polarisation between the south and
the north in terms of social indicators has
widened, while the east-west gap, which was gen-
erally wide before the crisis, is narrowing accord-
ing to some indicators but widening according to
others. Whatever the reasons behind adverse
social developments, the sad conclusion is that
EU membership was not enough to guarantee
social protection for many citizens.
Poverty and unemployment have a negative
impact on the current living conditions of a large
segment of society, and also have major negative
impacts on medium- and long-term economic
growth. Long spells of unemployment erode skills
and discourage labour market participation,
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thereby undermining a country’s long-term growth
potential. Youth unemployment is especially
alarming because a long period of unemployment
after graduation, when a worker should acquire
the first skills in the workplace, can undermine
whole careers – creating a lost generation and
also having trickle-down effects on fertility rates
and child support. Unemployment-related income
uncertainty reduces fertility and when children
grow up in families in which parents do not work
for long periods or work irregularly, their opportu-
nities are curtailed compared to children whose
parents work.
One reason for the increased social hardship is
fiscal consolidation. The high budget deficits and
rising public debt levels that followed the global
and euro-area financial and economic crises led
most EU states to embark on a series of fiscal
retrenchment strategies to stabilise their public
finances. However, it is not easy to derive a con-
clusion for policy from this observation. EU coun-
tries should be divided into two major groups and
conclusions for policy are different for each group.
• In one group, in which budget deficits were
exceptionally high and public debts started to
increase at a very rapid pace, there was no
alternative to fiscal consolidation: the question
was its speed and composition.
• In the other group, which includes most of the
EU, the fiscal situation was within reasonable
limits and macroeconomic stabilisation would
have called for fiscal support at a time when the
cyclical position of the European economy was
deteriorating. In these countries fiscal consoli-
dation, which started around 2009 and 2010,
was premature.
The aggregate of country-specific fiscal strategies
resulted in an overly tight fiscal stance for the EU
as a whole. Since there is no fiscal authority at the
EU or at least euro-area level to manage the aggre-
gate fiscal stance, it is unlikely that the fiscal
behaviour of the EU aggregate will be more con-
ducive to cyclical stabilisation in the future.
When looking at the composition of fiscal adjust-
ment, we found that spending on social protection
was shielded relative to other spending cate-
gories, which suggests that governments have
tried to cushion the social impact of the crisis. This
is good news. But we also concluded that bank
rescue was very expensive for taxpayers. Bank
rescue limited the fiscal resources available for
other purposes and resulted in greater fiscal con-
solidation needs, with a negative impact on the
economy and social conditions in Europe. The
changes in taxes broadly followed the advice of
the European Commission by moving the tax
burden away from labour toward consumption,
but since labour taxes are typically progressive
(except in a number of central European member
states), while the impact of consumption taxes is
regressive (the poor consume a larger share of
their income than the rich), such tax changes
might have adversely impacted the poorest seg-
ments of the society.
Last but not least, the crisis has brought to the fore
an increasing generational divide. Within social
spending, elderly people were protected most
during the crisis, possibly due to pension rules or
their better ability to assert their interests. Social
indicators for the elderly showed little deteriora-
tion and in fact the severe material deprivation
rate for elderly people has declined during the
past five years, which is certainly a benign devel-
opment. However, social spending on families and
children was preserved less than spending on the
elderly, and social indicators suggest that the
younger generation has suffered seriously: chil-
dren who live now in households in which their
parents no longer work and young people who are
not in work or education. Spending on education
was also cut substantially in the more vulnerable
countries, which can have adverse impacts on the
young. There is now a serious danger that a lost
generation might develop in several member
states, which would undermine medium- and
long-term growth prospects for the whole conti-
nent, adding to social and human costs.
Forceful policies are needed, well beyond what
has been announced so far, to improve social con-
ditions in Europe and limit polarisation. These
should include bold structural reforms, better use
of the European economic governance framework,
more demand promotion, and a revision of
national tax/benefit systems for improved effi-
ciency, intergenerational equity and fair burden
sharing between the wealthy and poor14.
14. Our policy proposals are
detailed in Darvas and Wolff
(2014a and 2014b).
15
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONZsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin  POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan J. and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2012) ‘Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy’,
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 4: 1–27
Ball, Laurence, Davide Furceri, Daniel Leigh and Prakash Loungani (2013) ‘The Distributional Effects
of Fiscal Consolidation’, Working Paper 2013/151, International Monetary Fund
Barbiero, Francesca and Zsolt Darvas (2014) ‘In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting
public investment in Europe’, Policy Contribution 2014/02, Bruegel
Baum, Anja, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Anke Weber (2012) ‘Fiscal Multipliers and the State of the
Economy’, Working Paper 12/286, International Monetary Fund
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Daniel Leigh (2013) ‘Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers’, Working
Paper 18779, February, NBER
Buti, Marco and Nicolas Carnot (2013) ‘The debate on fiscal policy in Europe: beyond the austerity
myth’, ECFIN Economic Brief, Issue 20.
Currie, Janet and Hannes Schwandt (2014) ‘Short- and long-term effects of unemployment on
fertility’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (41), 14734-14739
Darvas, Zsolt (2010), ‘Europe’s role in global imbalances’, July, Bruegel blog,
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/45-europes-role-in-global-imbalances/ 
Darvas, Zsolt and Guntram B. Wolff (2013) ‘Should non-euro area countries join the single
supervisory mechanism?’ Policy Contribution 2013/06, Bruegel
Darvas, Zsolt and Guntram B. Wolff (2014a), ‘Europe's social problem and its implications for
economic growth’, Policy Brief 2014/03, Bruegel
Darvas, Zsolt and Guntram B. Wolff (2014b), ‘To the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary
Affairs’, in Sapir, André (ed) Memos to the new EU leadership – EU to do in 2015-2019, Bruegel
Darvas, Zsolt, Pia Hüttl, Carlos De Sousa and Alessio Terzi and Olga Tschekassin (2014) ‘Austerity and
Poverty in the European Union’, , Brussels, available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/518758/IPOL_STU282014%29518758_EN.pdf,
European Parliament
Dell’Erba, Salvatore, Ksenia Koloskova and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro (2014) ‘Medium-Term Fiscal
Multipliers during Protracted Recessions’, Working Paper 14/213, International Monetary Fund
Dübel, Hans-Joachim (2013) The Capital Structure of Banks and Practice of Bank Restructuring: Eight
Case Studies on Current Bank Restructurings in Europe, Final Report prepared for Centre for
Financial Studies, University of Frankfurt
Duiella, M. and Alesandro Turrini, (2014) ‘Poverty developments in the EU after the crisis: a look at
main drivers’, ECFIN Economic Brief
Eurobarometer (2012) ‘Monitoring the social impact of the crisis: public perceptions in the European
Union (wave 6)’, Flash Eurobarometer 338, European Commission
European Commission (2013) ‘Report on Public finances in EMU 2013’ , European Economy 4/2013
Galliea, Duncan, Serge Paugam and Sheila Jacobs, (2003) ‘Unemployment, poverty and social
isolation: Is there a vicious circle of social exclusion?’, European Societies, Volume 5, Issue 1 
Giavazzi, Fransesco and Marco Pagano (1990) ‘Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?
Tales of Two Small European Countries’, Macroeconomics Annual 5, 75–111, NBER
Guajardo, Jaime, Daniel Leigh and Andrea Pescatori (2011) ‘Expansionary Austerity: New
International Evidence’, Working Paper 2011/158, International Monetary Fund
Jäntti, Markus and Bruce Bradbury (2003) ‘Child poverty across industrialized countries’, Journal of
Population and Social Security (Population), Supplement to Volume 1
Kreyenfeld, Michaela and Gunnar Andersson (2014) ‘Socioeconomic differences in the
16
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION POOR AND UNDER PRESSURE Zsolt Darvas and Olga Tschekassin
unemployment and fertility nexus: Evidence from Denmark and Germany’, Advances in Life Course
Research 21, 59-73
Matsaganis, Manos (2013) ‘The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses’, Study published
by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Merler, Silvia and Jean Piani-Ferry (2012) ‘The simple macroeconomics of North and South in EMU’,
Working Paper 2012/12, Bruegel
OECD (2011) ‘An overview of growing income inequalities in OECD countries: Main findings’, in OECD,
Divided We Stand: Why inequality keeps rising?, OECD Publishing,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119536-en  
OECD (2012) Education at a glance, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD (2013) ‘Crisis squeezes income and puts pressure on inequality and poverty’,
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/OECD2013-Inequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf  
Sapir, André, Guntram B. Wolff, Carlos De Sousa and Alessio Terzi (2014) ‘The Troika and financial
assistance in the euro area: successes and failures’, study prepared on the request of the
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
Valletta, Robert G. (2004) ‘The Ins and Outs of Poverty in Advanced Economies: Poverty Dynamics in
Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States’, Working Paper 2004-18, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco
Woo, Jaejoon, Elva Bova, Tidiane Kinda,and Y. Sophia Zhang (2013) ‘Distributional Consequences of
Fiscal Consolidation and the Role of Fiscal Policy: What Do the Data Say?’, Working Paper
2013/195, International Monetary Fund
Zaidi, Asghar (2009) ‘Poverty and Income of Older People in OECD Countries’, Working Paper, available
at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1992492 
